What Is Meant by "Missing at Random"? by Seaman, Shaun et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
6.
28
12
v1
  [
sta
t.M
E]
  1
2 J
un
 20
13
Statistical Science
2013, Vol. 28, No. 2, 257–268
DOI: 10.1214/13-STS415
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2013
What Is Meant by “Missing at
Random”?
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Abstract. The concept of missing at random is central in the literature
on statistical analysis with missing data. In general, inference using in-
complete data should be based not only on observed data values but
should also take account of the pattern of missing values. However, it
is often said that if data are missing at random, valid inference using
likelihood approaches (including Bayesian) can be obtained ignoring
the missingness mechanism. Unfortunately, the term “missing at ran-
dom” has been used inconsistently and not always clearly; there has
also been a lack of clarity around the meaning of “valid inference using
likelihood”. These issues have created potential for confusion about
the exact conditions under which the missingness mechanism can be
ignored, and perhaps fed confusion around the meaning of “analysis
ignoring the missingness mechanism”. Here we provide standardised
precise definitions of “missing at random” and “missing completely at
random”, in order to promote unification of the theory. Using these
definitions we clarify the conditions that suffice for “valid inference” to
be obtained under a variety of inferential paradigms.
Key words and phrases: Ignorability, direct-likelihood inference, fre-
quentist inference, repeated sampling, missing completely at random.
1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on missing data is not entirely clear
with respect to the assumptions required for differ-
ent types of analysis to be valid. First, although the
term “missing at random” (MAR) has been widely
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regarded as central to the theory underlying miss-
ing data methods since the seminal paper of Rubin
(1976) [33], it has not always been used in a consis-
tent manner. There has often been a lack of detail
about whether the MAR condition is a statement
only about the realised missingness pattern or about
all possible patterns and whether it is only about the
realised values of the observed data or all possible
observable data values. Second, the distinction be-
tween direct-likelihood and frequentist inference us-
ing the likelihood function is not always made clear.
Third, it is sometimes said that “missing completely
at random” (MCAR) is needed for frequentist infer-
ence; at other times MAR is said to be sufficient.
While it is clear that some researchers writing
on the theory of missing data have known what
they intended, the omission of details by many au-
thors, together with the seemingly different condi-
tions assumed by different authors, make it difficult
for readers to know precisely what was meant, and
also to compare the work of different authors. This
confusion has implications for statistical practice,
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since data analysts are encouraged to consider the
plausibility of the MAR assumption before applying
certain methods of analysis (e.g., [38]), but if the
conscientious analyst consults the theoretical litera-
ture they will struggle to find a clear consensus on
definitions and on how they relate to the validity
of possible analytic approaches. Further confusion
surrounds the concept of “ignorability”, which does
not seem to be well understood by practitioners and
may be misinterpreted as providing a broad licence
to ignore the fact that not all the desired data have
been observed.
In the present article, our objectives are to:
(1) draw attention to the various gaps and incon-
sistencies in some definitions of MAR used in the
literature; (2) provide unambiguous formulations of
relevant MAR definitions; and (3) explain the rela-
tion between MAR and ignorability under different
frameworks of statistical inference and, in so doing,
identify the need for more than one definition of
MAR.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we provide definitions of two distinct MAR
conditions, one stronger than the other, and likewise
for MCAR. The inconsistency in previous usage of
the terms “MAR” and “MCAR” is documented in
Section 3. The definitions of MAR and MCAR are
central to the concept of ignorability, the definition
of which varies according to the chosen framework
of statistical inference. In Section 4 we distinguish
between direct-likelihood inference, Bayesian infer-
ence, frequentist inference using the likelihood func-
tion and the frequentist properties of Bayesian esti-
mators. Section 5 contains an explanation of which
MAR/MCAR conditions are needed for the miss-
ingness mechanism to be ignorable for each of these
types of inference. Section 6 covers the use of con-
ditional likelihood and repeated sampling. We end
with a discussion.
2. TWO DEFINITIONS OF MAR AND MCAR
We use Y to denote the vector of potentially ob-
servable data values (on all sample units), which for
modelling purposes we treat as a random variable.
Let M denote a vector of missingness indicators of
the same length as Y. The jth element of M equals
one if the jth element of Y is observed and zero if
it is missing. Let o(Y,M), a function of Y and M,
denote the subvector of Y consisting of elements
whose corresponding elements of M equal one. So,
o(Y,M) contains the observed elements of Y. Let
K denote the length of o(Y,M). So, K is a ran-
dom variable and is equal to the sum of the ele-
ments of M. When no elements of Y are observed,
o(Y,M) is the empty set and K = 0. The reader
may be familiar with the notation Yobs and Ymis.
We choose not to use this notation because it is am-
biguous, as we explain in Section 3. However, our
notation o(Y,M) is equivalent to Yobs as usually
interpreted. When we consider a specific sample, it
is convenient to have notation for the realised values
of the random variables M and Y; we denote these
realised values as m˜ and y˜, respectively. “Realised”
and “observed” values should not be confused. The
observed value, o(Y,M), of Y is a random variable
and has a realised value, o(y˜,m˜). The values of m˜
and o(y˜,m˜) are known, but that of y˜ is only known
if all elements of m˜ equal one.
In the special case where the data are modelled
as a set of J random variables measured on each of
n units, as is often the case, Y is a vector of length
nJ . Although in this special case one might alter-
natively define Y as a matrix with n rows and J
columns, for the sake of generality we do not do this.
For example, suppose thatY consists of two random
variables, X and Z, measured on each of two units,
that the realised value of (X,Z) is (10,3) for the
first unit and (4,2) for the second, and that X is ob-
served for both units but Z is only observed for the
second. Then y˜= (10,3,4,2)T , m˜= (1,0,1,1)T and
o(y˜,m˜) = (10,4,2)T . Note that o(y,m) cannot be
interpreted without the accompanying value of m˜.
Consider a hypothesised “missingness model”, that
is, a model for the conditional distribution of M
given Y. Let gφ(m | y) denote the probability that
M=m given that Y = y according to this model,
where φ is an unknown parameter. We now present
two definitions of MAR.
Definition 1. The data are realised MAR if ∀φ,
gφ(m˜ | y) = gφ(m˜ | y˜)
∀y such that o(y,m˜) = o(y˜,m˜)
(where y represents a value of Y). This means that
the hypothesised missingness model always (i.e., for
all values of φ) assumes that the conditional proba-
bility that the missingness pattern M is its realised
value m˜, given the realised values of the elements of
the data Y that are observed when M= m˜ and the
values of the remaining, missing, elements, does not
depend on these missing elements. Rubin [33] ex-
MISSING AT RANDOM 3
pressed this as follows: “The missing data are miss-
ing at random if for each possible value of the pa-
rameter φ, the conditional probability of the ob-
served pattern of missing data, given the missing
data and the value of the observed data, is the same
for all possible values of the missing data”. There are
several things to note about this definition. First,
it is a statement only about the realised missing-
ness pattern and realised observed data, not about
missingness patterns or observed data that could
have been realised but were not. Second, it is a
statement about a hypothesised missingness model,
rather than necessarily the true missingness process.
Definition 2. The data are everywhere MAR
if ∀φ,
gφ(m | y) = gφ(m | y
∗)
∀m,y,y∗ such that o(y,m) = o(y∗,m)
(where y and y∗ represent a pair of values of Y).
This means that the hypothesised missingness model
always assumes that, for any value of the data, the
probability of any possible missingness pattern, given
the values of the corresponding observed elements
and missing elements of the data, does not depend
on the values of the missing elements. In order to
make more obvious the difference between realised
and everywhere MAR, note that Definition 1 can
be rewritten as follows. The data are realised MAR
if ∀φ, gφ(m˜ | y) = gφ(m˜ | y
∗) ∀y,y∗ such that o(y,
m˜) = o(y∗,m˜) = o(y˜,m˜). Unlike realised MAR, ev-
erywhere MAR is a statement about all possible
missingness patterns and values of the observed data.
Note that everywhere MAR implies realised MAR.
To illustrate and clarify the notation that we have
used here, consider the example given above, that
is, y˜ = (10,3,4,2)T , m˜= (1,0,1,1)T and o(y˜,m˜) =
(10,4,2)T . The data are realised MAR if ∀φ, gφ((1,0,
1,1)T | y) = gφ((1,0,1,1)
T | y∗) ∀y,y∗ such that the
first, second and fourth elements of both y and y∗
equal, respectively, 10, 4 and 2. That is, the data are
realised MAR if, for any φ, gφ((1,0,1,1)
T | (10, a,
4,2)T ) = gφ((1,0,1,1)
T | (10, b,4,2)T ) for all a, b in
the sample space of the second element of Y.
Now consider the special case of independent iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) data, that is,Y = (YT
1
, . . . ,
YTn )
T andM=(MT
1
, . . . ,MTn )
T , where (Yi,Mi) (i=
1, . . . , n) are i.i.d. Let o1(Yi,Mi) denote the subvec-
tor of Yi consisting of elements of Yi whose corre-
sponding elements of Mi equal one. [Note that the
function o1 is analogous to the previously defined
o(·), but whereas o(·) is a function of all the data,
o1 is a function of only the data for a single unit.] So,
Yi,Mi and o1(Yi,Mi) denote the data, the missing-
ness pattern and the observed data, respectively, for
the ith of n units. Consider a hypothesised model for
the conditional distribution of Mi given Yi, and let
gφ,1(mi | yi) denote the probability that Mi = mi
given that Yi = yi according to the model. In this
case, Definitions 2 and 3 are equivalent.
Definition 3. The data are everywhere MAR
if ∀i,φ,
gφ,1(mi | yi) = gφ,1(mi | y
∗
i )
∀yi,y
∗
i such that o1(yi,mi) = o1(y
∗
i ,mi).
Definition 3 may only be applied when (Y1,M1),
. . . , (Yn,Mn) are i.i.d. If, for example, Y1, . . . ,Yn
were i.i.d. andM1, . . . ,Mn were identically distribut-
ed but with Mi depending on Mj and/or Yj for
j 6= i, then (Y1,M1), . . . , (Yn,Mn) would not be
i.i.d. and so Definition 3 could not apply. The data
might nevertheless still be everywhere MAR by Def-
inition 2.
Finally, we present two definitions of MCAR.
Definition 4. The data are realised MCAR
if ∀φ,
gφ(m˜ | y) = gφ(m˜ | y
∗) ∀y,y∗.
Definition 5. The data are everywhere MCAR
if ∀φ,
gφ(m | y) = gφ(m | y
∗) ∀m,y,y∗.
Realised MCAR means that the probability of the
realised missingness pattern given the data does not
depend on the data. Realised MCAR implies realised
MAR but not everywhere MAR. Everywhere MCAR
means that the probability of any missingness pat-
tern given the data does not depend on the data,
that is, M is independent of Y. Everywhere MCAR
implies realised MCAR, realised MAR and every-
where MAR.
3. MAR AND MCAR IN THE LITERATURE:
A REVIEW
Historically, the first definition of MAR was that
of Rubin (1976) [33]. This is Definition 1, that is,
the definition for realised MAR (apart from minor
differences in notation and the fact that Rubin’s def-
inition begins “The missing data are MAR” rather
than “The data are MAR”). Rubin (1987) [36] largely
avoided the term “MAR”, preferring instead the
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terms “ignorable sampling” and “ignorable response”.
However, he did (page 53) briefly discuss the relation
between these three terms. It is evident from that
discussion that he was using the Rubin (1976) [33]
definition. Heitjan and colleagues, in a series of pa-
pers (e.g., [10–15]), consistently used “MAR” to
mean realised MAR. Harel and Schafer [9] also de-
fined realised MAR. Most other authors have used
“MAR” to mean everywhere MAR.
Several authors (Schafer [37]; Kenward andMolen-
berghs [20]; Lu and Copas [25]; Jaeger [17]) pro-
vided definitions of everywhere MAR but accompa-
nied this definition with a citation of Rubin (1976)
[33] (which defines realised, rather than everywhere,
MAR). In fact, most of these authors said explicitly
that their definition was an expression of Rubin’s
(1976) [33] definition.
The potential of the variety of definitions of MAR
to cause confusion was illustrated by an exchange
of letters between Heitjan [13] and Diggle [5]. Note
that according to Rubin’s (1976) [33] definition (i.e.,
realised MAR), if all the data are observed, they
cannot fail to be MAR (although one might alter-
natively say that his definition is a statement about
the missing data and in this situation there are no
missing data, so there are no missing data to be
MAR). Heitjan gave an example in which a single
variable X is measured on n individuals and could
potentially be missing on some of these individuals.
However, he supposed that in the data set actually
observed, X is observed on all n individuals, so there
are no missing data. He stated that the data are
MAR. Diggle responded by saying that the data are
not MAR, since the probability that X is observed
depends on X , which could be missing. The reason
for this disagreement is that Heitjan was using the
definition of realised MAR whereas Diggle was using
that of everywhere MAR.
In addition to the problems caused by this dual
use of the term “MAR”, definitions of MAR found in
some of the key literature on missing data, including
textbooks, contain certain ambiguities.
Many authors (Little and Rubin [23, 24]; Scha-
fer [37]; Kenward and Molenberghs [20]; Harel and
Schafer [9]; Fitzmaurice et al. [8]) used the problem-
atic notation Yobs and Ymis mentioned in Section 2.
Little and Rubin [23, 24], for example, said that
Yobs denotes the observed components or entries of
Y, that Ymis denotes the missing components, and
that the missing data mechanism is called MAR if
f(M |Y,φ) = f(M |Yobs,φ) ∀Ymis,φ(1)
[where f(· | ·) denotes a conditional distribution].
The notation f(M |Yobs,φ) is somewhat confusing,
because Yobs is itself a function of M. Interpreted
literally, Yobs = o(Y,M). Hence, if Yobs is known,
then K is also known, and so f(M |Yobs,φ) should
equal zero unless the number of nonzero elements of
M equals K. Nevertheless, we presume that equa-
tion (1) was intended to mean Definition 2 (i.e., ev-
erywhere MAR). Fitzmaurice et al. [8] gave a defi-
nition similar to equation (1), but added that this
means M is conditionally independent of Ymis given
Yobs. This is rather difficult to interpret, given that
Ymis is a function of M.
Another source of ambiguity concerns the param-
eter φ. Definitions 1–3 require a particular equality
to hold for all values of φ. Several authors (Robins
and Gill [31]; Kenward and Molenberghs [20]; Tsi-
atis [39]; Fitzmaurice et al. [8]) omitted the param-
eter φ when defining MAR, with the result that it
is not obvious whether equality is required to hold
for all φ or just for its “true” value. Schafer [37]
did include φ, but was also unclear about whether
equality must hold for all φ. Judging from the use
that these authors made of their MAR assumptions,
most of them seem implicitly to have meant that the
equality should hold for all φ. However, Fitzmaurice
et al. [8] seem to require equation (1) to hold only
for the true value of φ: they appear to be referring
to the “true” missingness mechanism, rather than
to a model for the missingness. We shall return to
this point in Section 7.
Just as there can be ambiguity about φ, it is some-
times not entirely clear whether a definition of MAR
requires an equality to hold for all Y or just for Y
compatible with o(y˜,M). See, in particular, equa-
tion (1).
We have concentrated on MAR, but there is also
ambiguity about the definition of MCAR. In his
original 1976 paper [33], Rubin did not mention
MCAR. He instead introduced the concept of the
observed data being “observed at random”. The re-
alised
MCAR definition (Definition 4) is equivalent to the
combination of the missing data being realised MAR
and the observed data being observed at random [11]
(see also Little [21]). Heitjan and colleagues have
used “MCAR” to mean realised MCAR. Many other
authors (e.g., Little and Rubin [23, 24] and [37])
have used “MCAR” to mean everywhere MCAR.
In the situation of repeated-measures outcome data
with fully observed covariates, Molenberghs and Ken-
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ward [26] used “MCAR” to mean that missingness
in the outcomes cannot depend on the outcomes but
can depend on the covariates. Elsewhere this has
been called “covariate-dependent MCAR” [22, 41].
4. DIRECT-LIKELIHOOD, BAYESIAN AND
FREQUENTIST INFERENCE
In Section 5 we shall discuss ignorability. The def-
inition of ignorability depends on the framework
of inference adopted. Here we review the distinc-
tions between four types of inference: Bayesian in-
ference, direct-likelihood inference (also known as
pure-likelihood inference), general frequentist infer-
ence and frequentist likelihood inference. For sim-
plicity of exposition, we describe inference when the
data Y are fully observed. In Section 5 we describe
the generalisation to incomplete data.
In Bayesian and direct-likelihood inference a prob-
ability distribution function is specified for the
data Y. This function involves a finite set of un-
known parameters, θ. Some of these are of interest
and the aim is to make inference about their values;
others may be nuisance parameters. The likelihood
is defined as any multiple of this probability distri-
bution function where the multiplier does not de-
pend on any of the parameters. Whereas the proba-
bility distribution function is regarded as a function
of the data with the values of the parameters con-
sidered fixed, the likelihood is regarded as a function
of the parameters with the data considered fixed.
In direct-likelihood inference [2, 28, 30], the value
of the parameters at which the likelihood is a max-
imum (the maximum likelihood estimate) is used
as a point estimate and the ratio of the value of
the likelihood at different parameter values is used
to judge which parameter values are plausible. The
normalised likelihood is defined as the likelihood di-
vided by the value of the likelihood at the max-
imum likelihood estimate (so that the normalised
likelihood takes value one at the maximum likeli-
hood estimate). When there is only one parame-
ter, a likelihood interval is defined as the set of pa-
rameter values within which the values of the nor-
malised likelihood are greater than some threshold.
Different thresholds have been proposed, for exam-
ple, Fisher [7] suggested 1/15 and Royall [32] sug-
gested 1/32.
When there is more than one parameter, a likeli-
hood interval for any one of them can be obtained
by first eliminating the others. Two commonly used
ways to eliminate parameters are the profile likeli-
hood method and the conditional likelihood method.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that θ = (θ1,θ2),
where θ2 are the parameters to be eliminated. The
profile likelihood for θ1 is defined as the function
obtained, for each possible value of θ1, by fixing
θ1 at that value and then maximising the likeli-
hood for θ over the space of θ2. In the profile like-
lihood method, a likelihood interval for θ1 is cal-
culated using the profile likelihood for θ1 in place
of the likelihood for θ. In the conditional likelihood
method, a conditional probability distribution func-
tion is specified for Y given a (possibly vector) func-
tion of Y. The resulting conditional likelihood con-
tains fewer parameters than the unconditional likeli-
hood, that is, that based on the unconditional prob-
ability distribution function forY. If the conditional
likelihood contains only θ1, it can be used to con-
struct a likelihood interval for θ1. If it contains addi-
tional parameters, these can be eliminated using the
profile likelihood method. There is no clear theoret-
ical basis for choosing between the profile likelihood
and conditional likelihood approaches, and each ap-
pear to have their merits for different situations.
In Bayesian inference, uncertainty about param-
eters is represented directly by probability models,
requiring a prior distribution to be specified. The
posterior distribution of the parameters is obtained
by Bayes’ theorem. For any of the parameters in
the model, the mean of its posterior distribution is
typically used as a point estimate and (αl, αu) used
as an interval of uncertainty (a credible interval),
where αl and αu are the lth and uth centiles (e.g.,
2.5th and 97.5th) of that parameter’s marginal pos-
terior distribution. This interval is interpretable as
meaning that the posterior probability that the pa-
rameter lies within (αl, αu) is (u− l)/100. The use
of the marginal posterior distribution means that
all other parameters are eliminated by integrating
them out of the joint posterior distribution of all
the parameters.
In direct-likelihood inference and Bayesian infer-
ence as described above, only the realised value of
Y is of interest; there is no consideration of other
values of Y that could have been realised but which
were not. Frequentist inference, on the other hand,
is concerned with the (hypothetical) repeated sam-
pling of Y and with the properties of inferential
summaries such as point and interval estimates un-
der this repeated sampling. It is only when repeated
sampling is considered that the concepts of bias,
standard error, efficiency, power and confidence in-
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terval become meaningful. The bias of an estimator
of a parameter, for example, is defined as the differ-
ence between the mean of the sampling distribution
of the estimator and the true value of the parame-
ter; the standard error is the standard deviation of
the sampling distribution of the estimator; a confi-
dence interval is an interval obtained using a rule
that has a stated probability of producing an inter-
val containing the true value of the parameter in a
repeated sample. One important example of a rule
for constructing confidence intervals is the rule used
in direct-likelihood inference to construct likelihood
intervals, that is, a likelihood interval becomes, in
the framework of frequentist inference, a confidence
interval.
In frequentist inference, a function s(Y) of Y is
chosen and its realised value, s(y˜), is compared with
the sampling distribution of s(Y), that is, the distri-
bution of s(Y) in repeated samples. This sampling
distribution may be conditional on the realised value
of a (possibly vector) function of Y. We distinguish
between general frequentist inference, where s(Y)
can be any function of Y, and frequentist likelihood
inference, where s(Y) depends on Y only through
the likelihood of Y. Frequentist likelihood inference
includes using the observed or expected information
to estimate the standard error of the maximum like-
lihood estimator (MLE), using this MLE and stan-
dard error to construct a confidence interval, using
likelihood intervals as confidence intervals, and us-
ing likelihood-ratio, Wald and score tests. Frequen-
tist likelihood inference is like direct-likelihood infer-
ence, in that it also uses the MLE and likelihood in-
tervals, but goes beyond it, in that it involves claims
about the behaviour of the MLE and likelihood in-
tervals in repeated samples. Frequentist likelihood
inference is often referred to simply as “likelihood
inference”.
Often even statisticians using Bayesian methods
are interested in frequentist properties of their esti-
mators, for example, the bias of the posterior mean
or the coverage of a credible interval [19, 35].
The distinction between direct-likelihood inference
and frequentist likelihood inference has not always
been made clear in the literature. For example, Heit-
jan and Rubin [15] and Harel and Schafer [9] referred
to direct-likelihood inference simply as “likelihood
inference”. Molenberghs et al. [27] appear to use
the term “direct-likelihood analysis” when writing
about repeated sample properties of the likelihood.
Also, the potential interest in frequentist properties
of Bayesian estimators has rarely been mentioned in
the literature on missing data, except in the context
of multiple imputation.
5. IGNORABILITY OF THE MISSINGNESS
MECHANISM
In this section we clarify which missingness as-
sumption suffices for the missingness mechanism to
be ignorable for each of the types of inferences de-
scribed in Section 4. Intuitively, “ignorable” means
that inferences obtained from a parametric model
for the data alone are the same as inferences ob-
tained from a joint model for the data and missing-
ness mechanism. To serve as a workable definition,
one needs to say what is meant by “the same”, and
in the literature authors have not always been ex-
plicit on this point. We endeavour to be clear, but
defer specification of our definitions to the relevant
subsections below.
Consider a joint parametric model for the com-
plete data Y and missingness pattern M. Let
fθ(y)gφ(m | y) denote the joint distribution of Y
and M according to this model, and let Ωθ,φ de-
note the joint parameter space for (θ,φ). Let y˜
and m˜ be a given realisation of Y and M. Let
Ωθ = pi1(Ωθ,φ) and Ωφ = pi2(Ωθ,φ) be the parameter
spaces for θ and φ, respectively, corresponding to
the joint parameter space Ωθ,φ. Following Heitjan
and Basu [14], we avoid measure-theoretic difficul-
ties by assuming that Y is discrete. Because in re-
ality all data are measured to finite precision, this
assumption is not restrictive. Reference to continu-
ous distributions should be interpreted as meaning
discrete distributions on a fine grid, and integrals
can be interpreted as sums.
The joint likelihood for (θ,φ) is the function with
domain Ωθ,φ given by
L1(θ,φ) =
∫
fθ(y)gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy,(2)
where r(y, y˜,m˜) equals one if o(y,m˜) = o(y˜,m˜) and
zero otherwise. Note that the integral here integrates
out the missing data. The likelihood for θ ignoring
the missing-data mechanism is the function with do-
main Ωθ given by
L2(θ) =
∫
fθ(y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy.(3)
For any fixed φ ∈Ωφ, the fixed-φ likelihood for θ is
the function with domain Ωθ given by
L3,φ(θ) = δ{(θ,φ),Ωθ,φ}
(4)
·
∫
fθ(y)gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy,
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where δ{(θ,φ),Ωθ,φ} equals one if (θ,φ) ∈Ωθ,φ and
zero otherwise. The profile likelihood for θ is the
function with domain Ωθ given by
L4(θ) = max
φ∈Ωφ
[
δ{(θ,φ),Ωθ,φ}
(5)
·
∫
fθ(y)gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy
]
.
In Section 6 we shall consider the use of conditional
likelihoods.
5.1 Direct-Likelihood Inference
The main work on ignorability for direct-likelihood
inference can be summed up in the following theo-
rem. After giving a proof, we shall discuss why this
theorem has been considered to justify the use of
L2, the likelihood for θ ignoring the missing-data
mechanism, when the data are realised MAR and
the parameters are distinct.
Theorem 1. If realised MAR holds and Ωθ,φ =
Ωθ×Ωφ, then: (i) L1(θ,φ) factorises into two com-
ponents, such that each parameter appears in only
one component; (ii) for any φ ∈Ωφ satisfying gφ(m˜ |
y˜)> 0, L3,φ(θ) is proportional to L2(θ); and (iii) if
∃φ ∈ Ωφ such that gφ(m˜ | y˜) > 0, then L4(θ) is a
special case of L3,φ(θ) and, hence, L4(θ) is propor-
tional to L2(θ).
Proof. As Ωθ,φ =Ωθ×Ωφ, it follows that when-
ever φ ∈ Ωφ and θ ∈ Ωθ, then (θ,φ) ∈ Ωθ,φ, and so
δ{(θ,φ),Ωθ,φ}= 1. So, for φ ∈Ωφ and θ ∈Ωθ,
L1(θ, φ) =
∫
fθ(y)gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy(6)
= gφ(m˜ | y˜)
∫
fθ(y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy(7)
= L5(φ)L2(θ),(8)
where
L5(φ) = gφ(m˜ | y˜)
is a function of φ only. Hence, (i) is true. Note that
line (7) follows because of realised MAR.
If realised MAR holds and Ωθ,φ =Ωθ×Ωφ, line (7)
is equal to L3,φ(θ). Since gφ(m˜ | y˜) is not a function
of θ, it then follows that L3,φ(θ) is proportional to
L2(θ) for any φ ∈ Ωφ such that gφ(m˜ | y˜) > 0. So,
(ii) is true.
Likewise, when the data are realised MAR and
Ωθ,φ =Ωθ ×Ωφ,
L4(θ) =
∫
fθ(y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy× max
φ∈Ωφ
gφ(m˜ | y˜).
The function maxφ∈Ωφ gφ(m˜ | y˜) does not depend
on θ. Moreover, it is nonzero when ∃φ ∈ Ωφ such
that gφ(m˜ | y˜)> 0. So, L4(θ) = L3,φˆ(θ), where φˆ is
the value of φ that maximises gφ(m˜ | y˜). Hence, (iii)
is true. 
In the literature, this factorisation of the joint like-
lihood and this proportionality of likelihoods have
been used as a basis for defining when the miss-
ingness mechanism can be ignored when perform-
ing direct-likelihood inference. Rubin [33], for exam-
ple, used the proportionality of likelihoods to write:
“When making direct-likelihood or Bayesian infer-
ences about θ, it is appropriate to ignore the pro-
cess that causes missing data if the missing data are
missing at random and the parameter of the miss-
ing data process is “distinct” from θ”. Anscombe [1]
wrote that when the joint likelihood for a parameter
of interest θ and a nuisance parameter φ factorises
into two components, such that each parameter ap-
pears in only one component, information on each
factor can be considered separately. The same was
written by Hinde and Aitkin [16]. Royall [32] called
the component involving θ the “likelihood for θ”
and said that the relative support for any two values
of θ is given by the ratio of the values of this like-
lihood evaluated at those two θ values. Edwards [6]
supported the use of the profile likelihood when the
joint likelihood factorises. He wrote: “since the value
of φ is irrelevant to our inference on θ, replacing φ in
[the joint likelihood] by its maximum likelihood esti-
mate will not invalidate the likelihood”. Kalbfleisch
and Sprott [18] agreed with Edwards. When com-
paring inference for θ using L1 and L2 in situations
where the two may give different answers, Heitjan
[10, 15], pages 1103 and 2249, interpreted inference
for θ using L1 as meaning inference using the pro-
file likelihood. Tsou and Royall [40] considered the
strength of evidence in the presence of a nuisance pa-
rameter as being the strength of evidence that would
be in the data if the value of the nuisance parameter
were known. That is, they considered the strength
of evidence to be the particular fixed-φ likelihood
for θ corresponding to the true value of φ.
All these authors, therefore, provide justification
for interpreting Theorem 1 as meaning that direct-
likelihood inference about θ can be performed using
L2 when the data are realised MAR and θ and φ
are distinct parameters.
To picture the effect of realised MAR and distinct-
ness of parameters on the joint likelihood L1(θ,φ),
it is helpful to consider a joint model where θ and
φ are both scalar parameters. The graph of L1 is
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then a surface in three dimensions lying above a
(θ,φ) plane. The realised MAR condition imposes
geometric structure on this surface [evident from
equations (7) and (8)] such that curves obtained
from the surface by fixing φ at various values are
all proportional, simply being copies of L2 scaled by
the conditional probability of realising the observed
missingness pattern under the given φ value. The
function L1 is, however, only defined for values of
(θ,φ) in Ωθ,φ. Hence, the curve formed from the L1
by fixing φ may be undefined for some values of θ
where the L2 curve is defined. So, one can think
of each curve formed from L1 by fixing φ as being
a proportional copy of L2 with, potentially, one or
more sections omitted. The assumption of distinct
parameters ensures that such “omitted” sections do
not exist, and therefore that the curves are propor-
tional at all θ values in Ωθ.
So far, we have considered the elimination of φ
as a nuisance parameter. As discussed in Section 4,
when a likelihood interval is required for a single ele-
ment, θ1, of a vector parameter, θ, the other param-
eters, θ2, are also nuisance parameters and must be
eliminated. If θ2 is eliminated from L2(θ) and L4(θ)
using the profile likelihood method, the proportion-
ality of L4(θ) and L2(θ) also ensures the propor-
tionality of the profile likelihoods for θ1 derived from
L2(θ) and L4(θ). Hence, the likelihood intervals for
θ1 obtained from L2 and L4 will be the same. We
discuss the use of conditional likelihood in Section 6.
5.2 Bayesian Inference
Consider Bayesian inference accounting for the
missingness mechanism. Let pθ,φ(θ,φ) denote the
joint prior distribution of (θ,φ) and let pθ(θ) de-
note the corresponding marginal prior distribution
of θ. The missingness mechanism is said to be ignor-
able for Bayesian inference if the marginal posterior
distribution of θ obtained from modelling both the
complete data, Y, and the missingness pattern, M,
is equal to the posterior for θ obtained by modelling
Y alone. The main work in this area can be summed
up by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that (1) the data are re-
alised MAR and (2) θ and φ are a priori inde-
pendent. The posterior distribution of θ that results
from using the likelihood L2(θ) and the prior p(θ)
is the same as the posterior distribution that results
from using likelihood L1(θ,φ) and prior pθ,φ(θ,φ).
Proof. When L1(θ,φ) and pθ,φ(θ,φ) are used,
the posterior distribution of (θ,φ) is proportional
to pθ,φ(θ,φ)L1(θ,φ). If θ and φ are a priori inde-
pendent, pθ,φ(θ,φ) factorises as pθ(θ)pφ(φ), where
pφ(φ) is the marginal prior for φ. If, furthermore,
the data are realised MAR, it follows from equation
(8) that the posterior distribution of (θ,φ) is pro-
portional to pφ(φ)L5(φ)pθ(θ)L2(θ). Since pφ(φ)L5(φ)
is a function of φ only, the marginal posterior dis-
tribution of θ is proportional to pθ(θ)L2(θ). This is
the same posterior distribution that is obtained if
L2(θ) and pθ(θ) are used. 
5.3 General Frequentist Inference
From the joint model, for any φ ∈Ωφ for which ∃y
such that fθ(y)gφ(m˜ | y)> 0, the conditional distri-
bution of o(Y,M) given M= m˜ is∫
fθ(u)gφ(m˜ | u)r(u,y,m˜)du
(9) /∫
fθ(u)gφ(m˜ | u)du.
In general, this distribution may depend on φ. Let
t{o(Y,M),M} be a function of o(Y,M) and M.
Rubin [33] called the distribution of t{o(Y,M),M}
givenM= m˜ implied by the distribution of o(Y,M)
given M = m˜ in expression (9) the “correct condi-
tional sampling distribution” of t{o(Y,M),M}. In
general, the distribution given by (9) is not equal to∫
fθ(u)r(u,y,m˜)du(10)
and so, in general, the conditional distribution of
o(Y,M) given M= m˜ is not that given by expres-
sion (10). Nevertheless, the latter distribution is the
distribution that corresponds to likelihood L2(θ).
Heitjan and Basu [14] called the distribution of
t{o(Y,M),M} given M= m˜ implied by the distri-
bution in (10) the “potentially incorrect sampling
distribution” of t{o(Y,M),M}.
Theorem 3. When the data are realised MCAR
and ∃y such that fθ(y)gφ(m˜ | y)> 0, the potentially
incorrect sampling distribution is equal to the correct
conditional sampling distribution.
Proof. If the data are realised MCAR, then for
each value of φ the value of gφ(m˜ | y) does not de-
pend on y. Hence, expression (9) reduces to expres-
sion (10). 
Note that in Theorem 3 repeated sampling is con-
ditional on the realised missingness pattern, that is,
conditional on M= m˜. Little [21] argued that it is
wrong to condition on M= m˜, as M is not an ancil-
lary statistic for θ unless the stronger condition of
everywhere MCAR is satisfied. Rubin [34] disagreed,
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saying that “the usual definition of ancillary (Cox
and Hinkley [3], page 35) is incorrect for inference
about θ and should be modified to be conditional on
the observed value of the ancillary statistic”. Heit-
jan [12] continued this discussion, introducing the
concept of an observed ancillary statistic and agree-
ing with Rubin’s assertion that the missingness pat-
tern can be conditioned upon when the data are re-
alised MCAR. As Rubin noted, although Theorem 3
might be regarded as a statement about when the
missingness mechanism can be ignored, the realised
missingness pattern itself is not ignored, because the
repeated sampling is conditional on it.
As mentioned in Section 4, repeated sampling may
be conditional on a function of Y. We discuss this
in Section 6.
5.4 Frequentist Likelihood Inference
Since frequentist likelihood inference is a special
case of general frequentist inference, Theorem 3 still
applies. However, for frequentist likelihood inference
a further result can be obtained when the data are
everywhere MAR and θ and φ are distinct. When
the data are not realised MCAR, M is not observed
ancillary, and so repeated sampling should not be
conditional on M. However, if the data are every-
where MAR and Ωθ,φ = Ωθ × Ωφ, it follows from
Theorem 1 that L2(θ), L3,φ(θ) and L4(θ) are pro-
portional not only in the realised sample but also in
repeated samples. Therefore, the MLE of θ, the esti-
mated variance of this MLE calculated from the ob-
served information matrix, likelihood intervals for θ,
and likelihood-ratio, Wald and score test statistics
for hypotheses concerning θ will be the same in both
the realised and repeated samples whether calcu-
lated using L2 or L1. That is, the same frequentist
likelihood inference for θ will be made whether one
uses L2 or L1.
A similar result applies for Bayesian point estima-
tors and credible intervals. Suppose that the data
are everywhere MAR and, for every possible data
vector Y and missingness pattern M, the prior for
(θ,φ) in the joint model can be written as p(θ,φ) =
p(θ) × p(φ), where p(θ) is the prior for θ in the
model that ignores the missingness pattern. Then,
for every possible (Y,M), the posterior distribu-
tion for θ derived from the likelihood L1 and prior
p(θ,φ) of the joint model is the same as that de-
rived from the likelihood L2 and prior p(θ) of the
model that ignores the missingness pattern. Con-
sequently, under these assumptions, the repeated-
sampling properties of Bayesian point estimators and
credible intervals for θ in repeated samples will be
the same whether one uses L1 and p(θ,φ) and inte-
grates over φ or one uses L2 and p(θ).
One important caveat needs to be stated. Stan-
dard errors can, in general, be calculated using ei-
ther the expected or the observed information. When
the data are everywhere MAR and θ and φ are dis-
tinct, the expected information from L2 should not
be used naively [20]. Using this expected informa-
tion is only appropriate under the stronger assump-
tion that the data are everywhere MCAR. It is rec-
ommended that the observed information be used
instead [20].
6. CONDITIONAL LIKELIHOOD AND
REPEATED SAMPLING
We now consider (1) conditional likelihoods and
(2) repeated sampling conditional not only on M=
m˜ but also on some function of Y. Let X = b(Y)
denote the function of Y being conditioned on and
x˜ denote the realised value of X.
First, consider the use of conditional likelihood.
One example of the use of a conditional likelihood
is where data Y consist of a set of covariates and
an outcome for a sample of individuals and this
outcome is regressed on the covariates. When the
covariates are fully observed, there is no need to
specify a likelihood for all of Y; instead, a likeli-
hood for the outcomes conditional on the covari-
ates is sufficient. Here, X consists of the covariates.
A second example is conditional logistic regression
for matched case-control data, where the likelihood
is conditional on the number of cases and controls
in each matched set. So here, X consists of these
numbers of cases and controls.
Assume that either x˜ is observed or
∫
fθ(y | x=
x˜)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy does not depend on the value of the
missing part of x˜. In equations (2)–(5), fθ(y) should
be replaced by fθ(y | x= x˜), the conditional prob-
ability distribution of Y given X = x˜. Theorem 1
then still applies. Moreover, if the data are every-
where MAR, then L2(θ) and L4(θ) [both with fθ(y)
replaced by fθ(y | x = x˜)] will be proportional not
only in the realised sample but also in repeated sam-
ples. Note that this repeated sampling is conditional
on X= x˜ but not on M= m˜.
Second, consider repeated sampling conditional on
X= x˜ andM= m˜. Assume that either x˜ is observed
or the distribution of t{o(Y,m˜),m˜}, given M= m˜
and X= x˜ implied by the distribution
∫
fθ(y | x=
x˜)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy, does not depend on the value of the
missing part of x˜. In equations (2)–(5) and (10),
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fθ(y) should be replaced by fθ(y | x= x˜), and fθ(u)
in equation (9) should be replaced by fθ(u | x= x˜).
Theorem 3 then continues to apply if “fθ(y)gφ(m˜ |
y) > 0” is replaced by “fθ(y | x = x˜)gφ(m˜ | y) > 0
and b(y) = x˜”. Moreover, the realised MCAR con-
dition in Theorem 3 can be replaced by the following
weaker condition: ∀φ, gφ(m˜ | y) = gφ(m˜ | y
∗) ∀y,y∗
such that b(y) = b(y∗) = x˜. In the special case of
repeated-measures data with fully observed covari-
ates and X being these covariates, the everywhere
version of this weaker condition has been called
“covariate-dependent MCAR” [22, 41].
7. DISCUSSION
In this article we have highlighted inconsistencies
in the use of the terms “missing at random” and
“likelihood inference”, and clarified the conditions
required for ignorability of the missingness mech-
anism. We urge those writing about missing data
to be clearer with respect to the assumptions be-
ing used and to employ clear terminology when de-
scribing approaches to inference, in particular, to
make the distinction between direct-likelihood and
frequentist likelihood concepts.
Rubin [33] used the term “ignorable” to mean that
two likelihoods, one derived from a model for the
data alone and one derived from a joint model for
the data and the missingness pattern, are propor-
tional or that two sampling distributions, the “po-
tentially incorrect” and correct conditional distri-
butions, are equal. In Section 5 we explained how
this implies that certain inferences for θ from the
two models are the same. In this interpretation, ig-
norability is a property of the assumed missingness
model. Whether this assumed model is correctly spec-
ified is not relevant. This interpretation of “ignora-
bility” may not be universal, however. As we saw in
Section 3, some writers have omitted the parameter
φ from their definition of MAR. Rather than refer
to a model for the missingness mechanism, they ap-
pear to have been referring to the “true” missingness
mechanism (which is usually unknown). Such writ-
ers may have interpreted ignorability to mean that
using L2(θ) for frequentist likelihood (or frequen-
tist Bayesian) inference will be valid, that is, will
yield consistent MLEs (or posterior modes), consis-
tent variance estimators, confidence (or credible) in-
tervals with asymptotic nominal coverage, etc. The-
orem 1 implies the following result. Suppose that the
“true” missingness mechanism is P (M = m | Y =
y) and that P (M =m |Y = y) = P (M =m |Y =
y∗) ∀m,y,y∗ such that o(y,m) = o(y∗,m). A hy-
pothetical analyst who knew this “true” missing-
ness mechanism and wanted to make inference for θ
taking missingness into account would use the like-
lihood
∫
fθ(y)P (M = m˜ |Y = y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy and,
by so doing, obtain valid frequentist likelihood (or
frequentist Bayesian) inference. Theorem 1 implies
that L2(θ) is proportional to this likelihood, and
hence that valid frequentist likelihood (or frequen-
tist Bayesian) inference would also be obtained us-
ing L2.
Despite MAR plus distinctness of parameters be-
ing presented in Little and Rubin [24] as the defi-
nition of ignorability (Definition 6.4), Theorems 1
and 2 only give sufficient conditions for when it
is appropriate to ignore the missingness mechanism
when making direct-likelihood and Bayesian infer-
ences, respectively. In the case of direct-likelihood
inference, Theorem 1 is concerned with sufficient
conditions for L3,φ(θ), the fixed-φ likelihood for θ,
to be proportional to L2(θ), the likelihood for θ ig-
noring the missing data mechanism. It is conceivable
that, even in the absence of realised MAR, there
may be a restricted set of φ values for which L2(θ)
is proportional to L3,φ(θ), and for this restricted set
to contain the “true” φ value. If so, it would be ap-
propriate to ignore the missingness mechanism even
though realised MAR does not hold. Lu and Co-
pas [25] showed that, when θ and φ are distinct and
the family of distributions fθ(y) form a complete
class, everywhere MAR is necessary and sufficient
for ignorability in frequentist likelihood inference. It
is straightforward to adapt their proof to show that
when θ and φ are distinct and the family of distri-
butions fθ(y | o(y,m) = o(y˜,m˜)) form a complete
class, then realised MAR is necessary and sufficient
for ignorability in direct likelihood inference (we in-
clude a proof in the Appendix). Furthermore, there
may conceivably be other ways, apart from that of
using a fixed-φ likelihood, to extract a likelihood
for θ from L1, ways which may not require realised
MAR and parameter distinctness in order for the
extracted likelihood to be proportional to L2. In
the case of Theorem 2, it is conceivable that inde-
pendence of the posterior distributions for θ and φ
may be a stronger condition than is necessary, and
it seems to still be an open question whether there
are substantially weaker conditions under which it
is appropriate to ignore the missingness mechanism
when performing Bayesian inference.
Note that the concept of missing data has been
generalised to that of “coarsened” data [10]. When
data are coarsened, data values are not necessarily
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either observed or missing, instead one observes a
set of values that is known to contain the realised
values. Censored survival data are an example of
coarsened data: a survival time may be known to be
greater than a given (censoring) time but not known
exactly.
We conclude with some brief remarks on the po-
tential practical implications of this work. Our re-
view of the literature on the theory of missing data
methods has highlighted a number of inconsistencies
and a lack of clarity with respect to key definitions
such as MAR and ignorability. We believe that these
issues have clouded the development and broader
understanding of methods in this area, partly be-
cause they intersect in considerable measure with
issues in the foundations of statistical inference. Al-
though the original definition of MAR (our “realised
MAR”) provides a clear basis for thinking about di-
rect likelihood and Bayesian inferences, the majority
of statistical practice is concerned with frequentist
evaluations. Even those who emphasise the Bayesian
interpretation of particular analyses are generally
interested in repeated-sampling performance of pro-
cedures. Incomplete data methods that do not ex-
plicitly model the missing data mechanism (i.e., that
assume ignorability) cannot be guaranteed to per-
form validly in repeated samples except under an
“everywhere” MAR assumption. The restrictiveness
of this assumption does not seem to be well un-
derstood, especially in complex problems with non-
monotone patterns of missingness [29, 31]. More im-
portantly, further work is needed on methods to
more effectively and systematically characterise the
potential sensitivity of inferences to departures from
the MAR assumption. Meanwhile, users of missing
data methods need to be reminded that methods
that assume ignorability provide tractable analyses
only at the cost of untestable assumptions.
It is also important to consider that when there
are missing data, there is more than one possible
target of inference. Diggle et al. [4] discuss alterna-
tive possible study objectives and targets of infer-
ence that are relevant to those objectives.
Much recent research in methods for handling miss-
ing data has considered issues that are specific to
the structure of the problem. For example, missing-
ness in outcomes poses different challenges than does
missingness in covariate values, and longitudinal (re-
peated measures) data present specific issues of their
own. We believe that it should be possible to tackle
these problems with greater clarity if the fundamen-
tal assumptions about missing data mechanisms and
their connection with the concept of ignorability are
better understood.
APPENDIX
Here we show that when θ and φ are distinct and
the family of distributions fθ(y | o(y,m) = o(y˜,m˜))
form a complete class, then realised MAR is neces-
sary and sufficient for ignorability.
Let o¯(Y,M) denote the subvector of Y consist-
ing of the elements whose corresponding elements
of M equal zero. So, o¯(Y,M) contains the missing
elements of Y. For any fixed value m of M, fθ(y)
can be written as
fθ(y) = f1,θ{o(y,m)}f2,θ{o¯(y,m) | o(y,m)}.(11)
Thus, choosing m= m˜ in equation (11), L1 can be
written as
L1(θ,φ) =
∫
f1,θ{o(y,m˜)}f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y,m˜)}
· gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy
= f1,θ{o(y˜,m˜)}
∫
f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)}
· gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy
and L2 can be written as L2(θ) = f1,θ{o(y˜,m˜)}.
Theorem. Suppose that Ωθ,φ = Ωθ × Ωφ, that
f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)} is complete, and that gφ(m˜ |
y˜)> 0 for all φ ∈Ωφ. Then L1(θ,φ) is proportional
to L2(θ) for any φ ∈Ωφ if and only if realised MAR
holds.
Proof. The “if” argument holds because of The-
orem 1. So, consider the “only if” argument. Sup-
pose that L1(θ,φ) is proportional to L2(θ) for any
φ ∈Ωφ. Then it must be true that for all φ ∈Ωφ,∫
f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)}gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy(12)
cannot depend on θ. Hence, we can denote expres-
sion (12) as Q{m˜, o(y˜,m˜),φ}.
By definition,∫
f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)}gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy
−Q{m˜, o(y˜,m˜),φ}= 0.
So,∫
f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)}gφ(m˜ | y)r(y, y˜,m˜)dy
−Q{m˜, o(y˜,m˜),φ}
·
∫
f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)}r(y, y˜,m˜)dy= 0
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for all φ ∈Ωφ. It then follows that∫
f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)}
· [gφ(m˜ | y)−Q{m˜, o(y˜,m˜),φ}]r(y, y˜,m˜)dy= 0
for all φ ∈Ωφ. So, if f2,θ{o¯(y,m˜) | o(y˜,m˜)} is com-
plete, then Q{m˜, o(y˜,m˜),φ}= gφ(m˜ | y) for all φ ∈
Ω and for all y such that o(y,m˜) = o(y˜,m˜). There-
fore, gφ(m˜ | y) cannot depend on o¯(y˜,m˜), that is,
the data are realised MAR. 
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